Do victims of crime trust less but participate more in social organizations? by Pazzona, M
Economics of Governance (2020) 21:49–73
https://doi.org/10.1007/s10101-019-00227-1
ORIG INAL PAPER
Do victims of crime trust less but participate more in social
organizations?
Matteo Pazzona1
Received: 5 October 2017 / Accepted: 13 September 2019 / Published online: 12 October 2019
© The Author(s) 2019
Abstract
We explore how crime victimization affects two of the main dimensions of social
capital: trust and participation in social groups. Using a large database that includes
many Latin American countries, we find that victimization lowers trust, especially in
other people and the police. However, participation in social groups is increased as a
result of this event. These findings suggest that the net effect of victimization on social
capital is miscalculated unless all of its dimensions are taken into account.
Keywords Crime · Social capital · Trust
JEL Classification K42 · 054 · D71 · D74
1 Introduction
Social capital is oneof the engines of economicgrowth (Keefer andKnack1997;Knack
and Zak 2001; Algan and Cahuc 2010). It solves many problems of collective action,
reduces the need for formal agreements and improves property rights. Social capital
is associated with many positive outcomes that foster prosperity, such as financial
knowledge (Guiso et al. 2004). It is also linked with negative outcomes, such as crime.
The existing literature generally concentrates on the effect of social capital on crime.
Rosenfeld et al. (2001) and Buonanno et al. (2009) showed that social capital can be a
strong deterrent to crime. However, the other side of the equation, i.e., theway inwhich
crime affects social capital, has received little attention. Few works have focused on
how individual crime victimization affects trust. Corbacho et al. (2015) analyzed the
effect of victimization on horizontal and vertical social capital, finding that victims of
crime are 10% less likely to trust the police compared to non-victims. Blanco (2013)
and Blanco and Ruiz (2013) studied the role of victimization and the fear of crime on
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trust and support in democracy, along with other dimensions of trust, for Colombia
and Mexico, finding a strong negative effect of victimization. In the present paper,
we explore whether victimization affects trust in other people and in various types
of organizations. In this way we can evaluate whether there are differences between
organizations that directly manage law and order, such as the police, and those that do
not, such as themedia.We consider individual data taken from theAmericasBarometer
for all the available Latin American countries from 2004 until 2012. As a result, we
have above 100,000 observations, many more than previous studies. Using propensity
score matching, we find strong evidence that those who are victims of crime have
lower levels of trust. For example, a victim has 7% less trust in other people. We also
find that trust is lower in institutions that directly manage law and order, such as the
police.
Trust is one of the main features of social capital (Coleman 1994; Putnam 1995,
2000), but not the only one. Other dimensions, such as civic engagement and election
turnout, are also important in promoting economic development and reducing transac-
tion costs. Despite their significance, few papers have evaluated the effect of crime on
these other dimensions. In particular, we know little about how victimization affects
participation in social groups. As far as our knowledge extends, only Bateson (2012)
studied its role in political participation, finding a positive effect. In the present paper,
wemake several contributions: we consider the effect on a variety of social groups, not
just political ones. We use the same dataset and econometric technique as those used
in the analysis of trust. As the main outcome variable, we use All Groups, a dummy
equal to one if the respondent participates once a week in various groups, and zero
otherwise. Our econometric analysis shows that victims of any type of crime are about
2.5% more likely than non-victims to participate in some kind of social organization
(using a single nearest neighbor). We explain such results using a psychological the-
ory, known as the stress-buffer hypothesis (Cohen and Wills 1985). This states that a
victim of crime seeks social support to alleviate the stress caused by such a negative
experience. As a consequence, this individual will participate more in such groups.
Since we are not psychologists, we will not explore this idea in detail, and do not
pretend it to be the only explanation.
As a robustness test, we repeat the estimationswith theChilean victimization survey
(ChileanMinistry of The Interor and Public Security 2016), which largely confirms the
previous findings. Victims of crime reduce their trust in other people and institutions
but increase their participation in social organizations. As a final exercise, we perform
the Rosenbaum Bounds (Rosenbaum 2002; Becker and Caliendo 2007) test for the
presence of unobservables. This reveals that the results relative to trust are very robust,
whereas we should be more cautious about the ones relative to participation.
The findings of this paper are important from a policy perspective. On the one
hand, victimization reduces individuals’ levels of social capital via reduced trust.
On the other hand, it increases it, via participation in social organizations. This means
that it is incorrect to say that victimization reduces social capital. Rather, victimization
decreases trust. The net effect of victimization on social capital should be reconsidered
in the light of these results.1
1 Still, crime represents a significant cost for the society (Skaperdas 2011; Soares 2006).
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This paper is organized as follows. In the second section, we review the literature
on the links between victimization and social capital. Sections 3 and 4 explain the
data, the econometric technique, and present the main results. Section 5 contains the
robustness exercises. In the sixth section we conduct several sensitivity tests. Section 7
concludes.
2 Literature review and theoretical background
The majority of the literature has established a crime reducing effect of social capital.
In a cross-country study of violent crime, this was shown by Lederman et al. (2002),
for the USA by Rosenfeld et al. (2001), and by Buonanno et al. (2009) for Italy. Social
capital increases social controls and the social stigma for potential offenders. Only in
some particular circumstances might some types of social capital lead to an increase
in crime. This is the case of “perverse social capital” in Colombian cartels (Rubio
1997) or “bonding ties” in evangelical Protestant communities in the USA (Beyerlein
and Hipp 2005)2.
Far fewer studies have analyzed whether and how crime affects social capital. The
scarce literature has focused mainly on the effect of victimization on various types
of trust. For example, Corbacho et al. (2015) investigated the effect of victimization
on vertical and horizontal measures of trust, using Gallup data for 2007. As their
crime variable, the authors considered whether 1) a person has been mugged and 2) a
person, or his family, had something stolen from them in the previous twelve months.
The authors analyzed the effect of being victimized on horizontal trust (in others,
friends and business partners) and vertical one (in the police and the judicial system).
Non-victims of crime have a 10%higher probability than victims of trusting the police.
The results for the other variables are somewhat mixed, with many not statistically
significant coefficients. Blanco (2013) and Blanco and Ruiz (2013) are two other
important contributions on this topic. The former explored whether victimization and
the fear of insecurity lower the support and satisfaction in democracy, trust in various
institutions, trust in the criminal justice system, and trust in others. The data for
Colombia were taken from the AmericasBarometer (Latin American Public Opinion
Project, LAPOP) for the period 2004-2010. Using an ordered logit technique, the
author found that victimization lowers satisfaction in democracy and trust in almost
all institutions. The author found no effect on trust in other people. In a similar work,
Blanco and Ruiz (2013) analyzed whether victimization and a feeling of insecurity
affect support for democracy and trust in various institutions. In this case the country
under analysis was Mexico, with data taken from the Latin American Public Opinion
Project (LAPOP) and the national victimization survey. The findings are similar to
those of Blanco (2013): victimization reduces both support for democracy and various
measures of trust in institutions. Along with these studies, many others have shown
2 Interestingly, the work on adolescents byWright and Fitzpatrick (2006) showed that social capital reduces




an indirect relation between victimization and various measures of trust and support
for democracy (Carreras 2013; Fernandez and Kuenzi 2010).3
We contribute to the existing literature by studying how victimization affects trust
in others and institutions. The other studies just mentioned were limited to one or a few
countries, but we will consider LAPOP data for all the Latin American countries, for
2004–2012. This means more than 100,000 observations, many more than the existing
research on this topic. In addition, we consider many crime categories, a novelty in
this literature. Using propensity score matching, we find that victimization negatively
affects all types of trust, both vertical and horizontal. Being a victim of crime has the
greatest negative effect on trust in other people and the police. We found little effect
on trust in institutions not directly related to the management of law and order.
Trust is a major components of social capital, but not the only one. Coleman (1994,
p. 302) argued that:
“social capital is defined by its function. It is not a single entity, but a variety of
different entities having two characteristics in common: they all consist of some
aspect of social structure, and they facilitate certain actions of individuals who
are within the structure”.4
These components of social capital are also important in promoting economic devel-
opment. Despite such a multi-dimensional concept, the relation between victimization
and other features of social capital has been largely ignored.5 We evaluate how and
to what extent victimization affects another important dimension of social capital:
participation in social groups. Does victimization reduce this dimension of social cap-
ital, as it does to trust? Are participation in social groups and trust complements or
substitutes? There are many reasons to presume that victimization increases this type
of participation, having the opposite effect on trust. First of all, trust is a subjective
measure. It is usually measured as the level of confidence in a person/group/institution
using a hypothetical scale. On the other hand, participation in social organizations is
a more objective measure, as it records the actual participation.6 Moreover, when a
person is a victim of crime, she is going through a stressful moment which can have
harmful psychological and physical effects. These are even more acute if the person
does not cope well with the elaboration of such negative event. Psychologists recog-
nize that a useful way to alleviate and ameliorate the negative effects of this experience
is through social support. This is the so-called stress-buffer hypothesis (Cassel 1976;
Cobb 1976; Cohen andWills 1985), in that social support buffers (protects) individuals
from the negative consequences of stressful periods. Social interaction is beneficial
to an individual’s health because it relativizes the importance of the event, provides
3 Also, there is an interesting study byBraakmann (2012)which analysed how victimization, and the beliefs
of victimization, alter the behavior of people. In particular, victims (or potential victims) are more likely to
arm themselves and increase the protection of their homes.
4 Or Putnam (1995, p. 6), who defined social capital as the “features of social organization such as networks,
norms, and social trust that facilitate coordination and cooperation for mutual benefit”.
5 In his 1994 study of Italy, Putnam et al. (1994) concentrated on civic engagement, which they proxied
by voter turnout, newspaper readership, membership in choral societies, soccer clubs, and confidence in
public institutions.
6 Even though self reported.
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distraction, and reduces anxiety. Large social networks provide people with regular
positive experiences. Therefore, we expect that the effect of victimization on partic-
ipation would not be negative, i.e., decreasing the stock of social capital, but rather,
zero or positive.
As far as our knowledge extends, in the literature there is only one other paper
which analyzes a similar relation: Bateson (2012) studied the effect of victimization
on political participation using data from various opinion polls. The results show a
positive and significant effect of victimization on all types of political participation,
with all coefficients below 0.05.7 Our work differs and complements it in many ways.
First of all, we consider all types of associational networks, and not only political
ones. This is consistent with the use of the stress-buffer hypothesis, which affirms that
(any) social groups alleviate stress from victimization. In our theoretical framework, a
political group is just one type of social group, but not the defining one. Finally, we take
into consideration the possible issues of contemporaneity between the victimization
and participation variables.
3 Data and econometric strategy
As our preferred estimation technique we will use propensity score matching (PSM)
(Rosenbaum and Rubin 1983). We decided to use this technique rather than regres-
sion because we are confident that the uncofoundedness condition holds for our data.
We employ data from the AmericasBarometer for all Latin American and Caribbean
countries for the five included between 2004 until 2012.8 Our main treatment vari-
able is the victimization question: “have you been the victim of any type of crime in
7 These authors used the post-traumatic growth hypothesis (Blattman 2009), instrumental concerns, and
emotional and expressive motivations to justify increased participation. She used data from opinion polls
such as the AmericasBarometer, Eurobarometer, Afrobarometer, and Asian Barometer. All these surveys
ask whether the respondent had been a victim of crime in the previous twelvemonths. The author recognizes
that in her work there are three threats to identification: reverse causation, neighborhood effects, and omitted
variable bias. She considered whether prior political participation might be what was affecting the current
participation, rather than its being a result of the victimization. To check this, past voting was introduced
into the regression and also matching was employed, using that variable as a predictor of victimization so as
to balance victims and non-victims in terms of their history of voting. The author found that victimization
does not have a statistically significant effect on past voting except for the USA and Canada. Neither do the
results change when controlling for local and national crime levels. Neighborhood factors are not the cause
of either victimization or participation. The author also controlled for the sociability and outgoingness of
the respondent, with LAPOP, but the results are hardly changed.
8 AmericasBarometer is a large household survey conducted in all the independent countries in themainland
North, Center, and South America. It also includes some Caribbean countries. This database, which is part
of the Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP), is mainly sponsored by the United States Agency
for International Development (USAID). However, it is also supported by the Inter-American Development
Bank (IADB), the United Nations Development Program (UNDP), and universities such as Vanderbilt and
Princeton, among others. The aim of this survey is to question people about democratic issues and behavior.
It was first launched in 2004 when it covered eleven countries and it is repeated every other year. The latest
available edition is 2012. Survey participants are voting age citizens and are interviewed in person, except
for Canada and USA, where they responded on the Web. The survey uses a national probability sample
design that takes into consideration characteristics such as location and ethnicity. Almost all the countries
have around 1,500 individual respondents, except for a few countries. In general, this data is considered to
be reliable, and has been used in several studies, such as the World Bank Governance Indicators.
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the last 12 months?” Table 1 shows that the percentage of victimized people ( those
who answered yes) over this period is 17.4%, about 146,000 individual observations.
Turning to the outcome variables, people were asked their level of confidence in other
people and in various institutions. They had to choose from a scale that runs from 1
(no confidence) to 7 (lots of confidence). We created a dummy variable equal to 1 for
the values 5, 6 and 7 and labeled trust in other people as Other People. Continuing,
we considered trust in the following institutions: the police, the supreme court, the
fiscalia, the army, the Catholic Church, the media, labor unions, and political parties.
We chose such variables to see whether there is a heterogeneous effect of victimiza-
tion on trust in “law enforcement related” institutions (the police, the supreme court,
the fiscalia) compared to the others. Table 1 shows that political parties are the least
trusted (42%), whereas Media is considered the most trustworthy (49.4%).
The choice of the participation variables is quite challenging from an econometric
point of view. In order for the PSM method to be valid, the outcome variable can-
not anticipate the treatment one. Otherwise, this would imply that the victimization
experience is consequent on the decision to participate in social organizations. If we
consider a standard participation question that refers to the previous twelve months,
we cannot be completely sure that this is valid. After all, a person who participates
in social organizations is more likely to go out of the house and, as a result, has
a higher probability of being victimized.9 The estimated Average Treatment Effect
on the Treated (ATT) might thus be positively biased. Fortunately, in the Americas-
Barometers database the respondents were asked not only whether they participated
in a given social organization, but also the frequency. Individuals were questioned
whether they attended a meeting of such an organization (a) once a week, (b) once or
twice a month, (c) once or twice a year, or (d) never. We created a dummy variable
equal to one if the person answered once a week and 0 otherwise. Such classification
helps us to be quite confident that the treatment (Victimization) precedes the outcome
variable. Let us suppose that a person was interviewed on the first of February 2012
and that she was victimized on the first of April 2011. Supposing that the person used
to attend a group’s meeting once a week at the time of victimization, she would have
had enough time to change behavior and move out of category a), attending once a
week. Nevertheless, she might decide not to go to church any more, but since she was
attending once a week, she might answer c) rather than d). In any case, she would
have 0 in the dummy for participation. The only situation where the respondent would
fall in category a) as a consequence of their behavior before being victimized would
be if the crime took place in the week right before the interview and the respondent
belonged to category a). In such a case, the individual might decide to answer a) even
though having changed attendance to less than once a week. Assuming that victimiza-
tion happens quite regularly over the year, the last event is quite unlikely and would
not affect the results.10
9 Unless we consider burglary. Even in that case, a person that participates more in social groups is more
likely to leave the house empty, which attracts more burglars.
10 Despite being confident on the identification strategy adopted, we cannot rule out completely that there
might still be some degree of reverse causation. For example, let us suppose that there is no effect of
victimization on participation in social organizations, but only one of participation on victimization. In
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Table 1 Summary statistics—AmericasBarometer
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Crime
Victimization 145,920 0.174 0.379 0 1
Property Crime 106,733 0.139 0.346 0 1
Violent Crime 106,733 0.009 0.095 0 1
Theft 106,733 0.113 0.316 0 1
Burglary 106,733 0.018 0.132 0 1
Assault 106,733 0.007 0.085 0 1
Trust variables
Other People 142,204 0.619 0.486 0 1
Police 144,384 0.385 0.487 0 1
Supreme Court 138,040 0.368 0.482 0 1
Fiscalia 53,501 0.351 0.477 0 1
Army 120,334 0.566 0.496 0 1
Catholic Church 141,698 0.646 0.478 0 1
Media 134,555 0.575 0.494 0 1
Union 8140 0.254 0.435 0 1
Political Party 142,627 0.228 0.420 0 1
Participation variables
All Groups 142,920 0.347 0.476 0 1
Religious 145,895 0.316 0.465 0 1
Community 145,201 0.036 0.185 0 1
Professional Organization 145,116 0.018 0.133 0 1
Political Party 144,875 0.019 0.136 0 1
Union 70,467 0.007 0.085 0 1
Cooperative 3029 0.009 0.094 0 1
Individual characteristics
Male 146,598 0.489 0.500 0 1
Age 146,227 38.783 15.664 16 99
Married 144,186 0.385 0.487 0 1
Education 144,275 8.908 4.479 0 18
Children 144,189 2.383 2.363 0 25
Urban 146,599 0.372 0.483 0 1
Low Income 146,599 0.354 0.478 0 1
Catholic Church 139,032 0.628 0.483 0 1
Life Satisfaction 143,961 3.169 0.817 1 4
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The participation variables which are available throughout the entire period of 2004
to 2012 refer to religious, community, professional, and political party organizations.
We created a dummy equal to one if the respondents declared participating once aweek
in at least one of these four organizations. We labeled this newly created variable All
Groups. A concern with this measure is that victimized people might be more likely
to go to self-help organizations. If such participation is made at the expense of other
organizations, the rise in participation might not be necessary related to a rise in social
capital. In order to take this concern into account, we also employ the variable All
Groups-No Prof Org, which considers only participation in religious, community, and
political party organizations. We also checked the separate effect of victimization on
unions and cooperatives, although there is not data for all fivewaves. Table 1 shows that
34.7% of the respondents participated once a week in at least one social organization.
Religious organizations make up a large proportion of this percentage.
In the absence of a reliable instrument for the explanatory variable, PSM is the
best alternative to regression analysis. The treatment variable, whether the individual
has been victimized, could be considered as randomly assigned after controlling for
our set of controls. As is common practice with PSM, we consider a rich set of
variables that affect simultaneously the treatment, Victimization, and the outcome
variables.11 Buonanno (2003) offered a good, although not up to date, survey of the
socio-economics determinants of crime. For social capital, we have somewhat less
literature to base our analysis on. Indeed, the paper by Glaeser et al. (2002) is a
prominent study. For Chile, Valdivieso and Villena (2014) provided an interesting
analysis of the formation of social capital.
The selection of variables was made following the statistical significance approach.
This consists in startingwith a parsimoniousmodel and then addingvariables, selecting
those which are statistically significant. Another requisite is that the control variables
should not change as a response or anticipation of the treatment, a condition largely
confirmed in our case.We have included age, gender,marital status, years of education,
number of children, urban, whether she has low income, Catholic, and life satisfaction
on a scale of 1 to 4.12 We calculated the probability of being a victim of crime in
Table 2 and estimated the model with probit. The coefficients represent the marginal
effects. In all the estimations, we included year and country fixed effects.
The results show a negative relation with Age, Married, Urban, Low Income,
Catholic Church, and Life Satisfaction. On the other hand, being male, educated,
and with children, increase the probability of being victimized. These results are in
line with the existing literature (Buonanno 2003). Well-off people are more likely to
be targeted, as they have more to steal from. This is particularly true since the major-
ity of crime are property crimes. The only coefficient that goes against the literature
is Urban, which is negative. Different algorithms for the propensity score analysis
yield homogeneous results. The large common support area (Fig. 1) allows us to have
such case we would incorrectly a positive effect where, in reality, there is not. We thank the anonymous
referee for pointing this out.
11 Caliendo and Kopeinig (2008).
12 For this first stage regression, we also evaluated the use of other measures of income, such as middle or
high income. Another candidate set of variables were the ones on ethnicity. Finally, we would have liked
to include work-related variables, but these were available only from 2006.
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Fig. 1 Common support area
good matches for each treated unit and increase the precision of the estimates. More-
over, the probability density functions (pdf) of the propensity score for victimized and
non-victimized are very similar.
This means that after conditioning on the control variables, Victimization seems
quite randomly assigned. As usual, we need to consider the trade-off between bias
and variance of the treatment effect. Having few matches for the treated leads to
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Table 3 Matched covariates
Mean t-test p > t
Treated Control %bias t
Male 0.535 0.536 − 0.3 − 0.35 0.728
Age 36.877 36.802 0.5 0.53 0.593
Married 0.377 0.373 0.9 1.01 0.314
Education 10.199 10.249 − 1.1 − 1.25 0.212
Children 2.047 2.044 0.1 0.13 0.899
Urban 0.247 0.244 0.5 0.57 0.571
Low Income 0.293 0.292 0.2 0.23 0.821
Catholic Church 0.631 0.638 − 1.5 − 1.58 0.115
Life Satisfation 3.138 3.142 − 0.6 − 0.59 0.555








The table presents the change in bias after matching. For references
check Rosenbaum and Rubin (1985)
lower bias but higher variance. We decided to consider three different specifications:
a single nearest-neighbor match with replacement (Nearest Neighbor (1)); the 100
nearest neighbor matches with replacement; a radius within 0.03 of the propensity
score (Table 3).
We then evaluated the quality of matching for our preferred algorithm, Nearest
Neighbor (1), but the results for the other algorithms are similar.13 The matching
exercise works well in balancing the covariates between treated and untreated. In
all cases, we cannot reject the null hypothesis. Table 4 reveals how the matching
procedures greatly reduce the mean and variance of the bias. Table 5 shows that, after
matching, the R-squared is 0, which means that the explanatory variables do not have
any predictive power at all for the probability of being victimized after matching.14
13 Results are available upon request.
14 As a further exercise, we have checked the balancing properties for each country. For the large majority
of countries and variables, we cannot reject the null hypothesis of statistical significant differences between
treated and untreated.
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Table 5 Changes in bias after
matching II
Pseudo R2 LR chi2 p > chi2
0 6.15 0.724
The table presents the change in bias after matching. For references
check Rosenbaum and Rubin (1985)
Table 6 Impact of Victimization on various measures of trust using AmericasBarometer
ATT S.E. # treated # untreated
Other People
Nearest Neighbur (1) −0.070*** 0.005 22,892 107,104
Nearest Neighbur (100) −0.070*** 0.004 22,892 107,104
Radius (r = 0.03) −0.070*** 0.005 22,892 107,104
Police
Nearest Neighbur (1) −0.065*** 0.005 23,077 107,727
Nearest Neighbur (100) −0.064*** 0.003 23,077 107,727
Radius (r = 0.03) −0.065*** 0.005 23,077 107,727
Supreme Court
Nearest Neighbur (1) −0.044*** 0.005 22,413 102,762
Nearest Neighbur (100) −0.042*** 0.004 22,413 102,762
Radius (r = 0.03) −0.044*** 0.005 22,413 102,762
4 Results
4.1 Trust
Table 6 reports the ATT for different algorithms for the trust variables. Victims of
crime have lower trust in all institutions except Union. The coefficients are highly
significant. The negative effect of crime is particularly strong for trust in other people
and in institutions that are directly related to the management of law and order. A
victim of any type of crime is about 7% less likely to have a high level of trust in other
people, which is the most negative ATT of all. It is closely followed by the Police
coefficient, which is 0.065 with the one nearest neighbor algorithm. Supreme Court
and Fiscalia follow closely. The lowest coefficient, in absolute terms, is the one for
Media, using the 100 nearest neighbor specification.
Compared with the existing literature, our results show some similarities, but also,
differences. For example, Corbacho et al. (2015) found a reduction of trust in police
by 10%, not too different from our value, 6.5 %. The same authors found a reduction
in trust in the judicial system of around 3%, whereas us between 3 and 4 % (trust
on the supreme court and the fiscalia). However, Corbacho et al. (2015) did not find
a significant on religious organizations whereas we do so.15 Continuing, we cannot
directly compare our results with Blanco (2013), because it is reported the coefficients





ATT S.E. # treated # untreated
Fiscalia
Nearest Neighbur (1) −0.034*** 0.008 8282 39,305
Nearest Neighbur (100) −0.030*** 0.006 8282 39,305
Radius (r = 0.03) −0.034*** 0.008 8282 39,305
Army
Nearest Neighbur (1) −0.026*** 0.006 19,844 88,558
Nearest Neighbur (100) −0.022*** 0.004 19,844 88,558
Radius (r = 0.03) −0.026*** 0.006 19,844 88,558
Catholic Church
Nearest Neighbur (1) −0.028*** 0.005 22,673 105,694
Nearest Neighbur (100) −0.021*** 0.004 22,673 105,694
Radius (r = 0.03) −0.028*** 0.005 22,673 105,694
Media
Nearest Neighbur (1) −0.021*** 0.005 21,880 102,015
Nearest Neighbur (100) −0.013*** 0.004 21,880 102,015
Radius (r = 0.03) −0.021*** 0.005 21,880 102,015
Union
Nearest Neighbur (1) −0.008 0.017 1681 6102
Nearest Neighbur (100) 0.002 0.012 1681 6102
Radius (r = 0.03) −0.008 0.017 1681 6102
Political Party
Nearest Neighbur (1) −0.029*** 0.004 22,900 106,384
Nearest Neighbur (100) −0.028*** 0.003 22,900 106,384
Radius (r = 0.03) −0.029*** 0.004 22,900 106,384
***Significant at the 1% level; **Significant at the 5% level; *Significant at the 10% level. This table reports
theATTsof thepropensity scorematching exercise using theAmericasBarometerData for all LatinAmerican
and Caribbean countries for the period 2004–2012. The treatment variable is Victimization which is equal
to one if the individual has been victim of any type of crime in the previous twelve months. The outcome
variables are expressed in the left column and represent trust in other people and various institutions. All of
them are binary variables equal to one if the respondent consider to have a lot of trust in such institutions.
Nearest Neighbor (1) means that each treated individual is matched with the closest untreated, whereas
(100) uses the closest 100. In both cases, matching has been done without replacement. Radius (r = 0.03)
means that matches are used within the propensity score of 0.03, again without replacement. S.E. are the
robust standard errors derived from Abadie and Imbens (2006), Abadie and Imbens (2009) and Abadie and
Imbens (2011)
employing an ordered logit approach. A main difference is that this author dis not find
trust in other people to be affected as we did. Nevertheless, similarly to our study,
these authors found a greater negative effect for institutions directly related with the
management of law enforcement.
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Table 7 The impact of Victimization on Participation in Social Groups using AmericasBarometer
ATT S.E. # treated # untreated
All Groups
Nearest Neighbur (1) 0.025*** 0.005 22,765 106,811
Nearest Neighbur (100) 0.023*** 0.004 22,765 106,811
Radius (r = 0.03) 0.025*** 0.005 22,765 106,811
All Groups-No Prof Org
Nearest Neighbur (1) 0.022*** 0.005 22,765 106,811
Nearest Neighbur (100) 0.020*** 0.004 22,765 106,811
Radius (r = 0.03) 0.022*** 0.005 22,765 106,811
Religious
Nearest Neighbur (1) 0.019*** 0.005 23,192 108,907
Nearest Neighbur (100) 0.016*** 0.003 23,192 108,907
Radius (r = 0.03) 0.019*** 0.005 23,192 108,907
Community
Nearest Neighbur (1) 0.011*** 0.002 23,081 108,442
Nearest Neighbur (100) 0.011*** 0.001 23,081 108,442
Radius (r = 0.03) 0.011*** 0.002 23,081 108,442
Professional Organization
Nearest Neighbur (1) 0.008 0.002 23,087 108,326
Nearest Neighbur (100) 0.008*** 0.001 23,087 108,326
Radius (r = 0.03) 0.008*** 0.001 23,087 108,326
4.2 Participation in social groups
Psychological theory, or simply common sense, leads us to doubt that victimization has
the same “negative” effect on participation in social groups as on trust. Table 7 reports
the ATTs with participation in various groups as outcome variables. The coefficients
are positive and significant for almost all the specifications. A victimized person is
likely to participate more in All Groups by about 2.5% compared to a non-victimized
person, using the one nearest neighbor specification. This coefficient is lower than the
one found for trust inOther People, but still significant. As expected, the result for All
Groups-No Prof Org is similar but with a slightly lower coefficient. Continuing, par-
ticipation in religious organizations and community organizations exhibit the greatest
coefficient of those among the organizations that compose All Groups.16 On the other
hand, Political Party has the lowest coefficient.
We also checked, although not reported, how the coefficients change using a less
restrictive time definition. Considering one month and 1year window, rather than one
week, we still have positive and highly significant results. As expected, the coefficients
are higher the greater the time window.
16 It is worth recalling that participation in cooperatives has the highest coefficient but was not asked in all




ATT S.E. # treated # untreated
Political Party
Nearest Neighbur (1) 0.004*** 0.001 23,043 108,149
Nearest Neighbur (100) 0.005*** 0.001 23,043 108,149
Radius (r = 0.03) 0.004*** 0.001 23,043 108,149
Union
Nearest Neighbur (1) 0.004*** 0.001 10,489 50,662
Nearest Neighbur (100) 0.002* 0.001 10,489 50,662
Radius (r = 0.03) 0.004*** 0.001 10,489 50,662
Cooperative
Nearest Neighbur (1) 0.027*** 0.008 448 2503
Nearest Neighbur (100) 0.023*** 0.008 448 2503
Radius (r = 0.03) 0.027*** 0.008 448 2503
***Significant at the 1% level; **Significant at the 5% level; *Significant at the 10% level. This table
reports the ATTs of the propensity score matching exercise using the AmericasBarometer Data for all Latin
American and Caribbean countries for the period 2004–2012. The treatment variable is the standard binary
victimization question referring to the previous twelve months. The outcome variables are expressed in
the left column. These represent various social organizations. The outcome variable All Groups is equal
to one if the individual has participated in one of the following social groups, at least once a week :
Religious , Community , Professional Organization and Political Party. Union and Cooperative are not
included because they are not available through out all the period 2004–2012. All Groups-No Prof Org
includesReligious ,Community and Political Party. For easiness of comparison, the number of observations
between All Groups and All Groups-No Prof Org have been kept equal. Nearest Neighbor (1) means that
each treated individual is matched with the closest untreated, whereas (100) uses the closest 100. In both
cases, matching has been done without replacement. Radius (r = 0.03)means that matches are used within
the propensity score of 0.03, again without replacement. S.E. are the robust standard errors derived from
Abadie and Imbens (2006), Abadie and Imbens (2009) and Abadie and Imbens (2011)
These results seem to confirm the stress buffer hypothesis (Cohen andWills 1985),
which affirms that people who are experiencing periods of stress (caused by victim-
ization in this case) seek social support to alleviate the negative consequences of such
experiences.
We then considered the effect of different types of crime on All Groups. We decided
to prioritize those crime categories that were available for the largest number of waves.
Except for the 2008 wave,17 we have data from the other four waves for theft, damage,
burglary, assault, rape, and kidnapping. The first three are grouped in the the category
Property Crime whereas the last three in Violent Crime. As we can see in Table 1, a
large majority of the crimes are property crimes: 13.9% versus less than 1% for violent
crime. The results of the propensity score matching can be found in Table 8. In each
estimation we excluded all the people that had been victimized by other types of crime
17 For this wave, data is missing.
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Table 8 Impact of different Crime Types on Participation in All Groups using AmericasBarometer
ATT S.E. # treated # untreated
Property Crime
Nearest Neighbur (1) 0.016*** 0.006 13,291 75,962
Nearest Neighbur (100) 0.018*** 0.005 13,291 75,962
Radius (r = 0.03) 0.016*** 0.006 13,291 75,962
Violent Crime
Nearest Neighbur (1) 0.013 0.023 879 75,962
Nearest Neighbur (100) 0.026 0.017 879 75,962
Radius (r = 0.03) 0.013 0.023 879 75,962
Theft
Nearest Neighbur (1) 0.009 0.007 10,805 75,962
Nearest Neighbur (100) 0.017*** 0.005 10,805 75,962
Radius (r = 0.03) 0.009 0.007 10,805 75,962
Burglary
Nearest Neighbur (1) 0.041** 0.016 1699 75,962
Nearest Neighbur (100) 0.017 0.012 1699 75,962
Radius (r = 0.03) 0.041** 0.017 1699 75,962
Assault
Nearest Neighbur (1) 0.023 0.027 700 75,962
Nearest Neighbur (100) 0.031* 0.018 700 75,962
Radius (r = 0.03) 0.023 0.026 700 75,962
***Significant at the 1% level; **Significant at the 5% level; *Significant at the 10% level. This table
reports the ATTs of the propensity score matching exercise using the AmericasBarometer Data for all Latin
American and Caribbean countries for the period 2004-2012. The treatment variables are various crime
types. Property Crime is the sum of theft, damage and burglary. Violent Crime is the sum of assault, rape
and kidnapping. The outcome variable All Groups is equal to one if the individual has participated in one of
the following social groups, at least once a week : Religious , Community , Professional Organization and
PoliticalParty.NearestNeighbor (1)means that each treated individual ismatchedwith the closest untreated,
whereas (100) uses the closest 100. In both cases, matching has been done without replacement. Radius
(r = 0.03) means that matches are used within the propensity score of 0.03, again without replacement.
S.E. are the robust standard errors derived from Abadie and Imbens (2006), Abadie and Imbens (2009) and
Abadie and Imbens (2011)
from the sample, to avoid contamination effects.18 In such a way, our results will not
be affected by the behavior of other victims of crime.19
Table 8 shows that the effect is positive for all types of crime, althoughnot significant
at the conventional level for all specifications. Those who have been a victim of
property crime, by far the largest category, increase their participation in All Groups
by 1.6%-1.8%, depending on the algorithm employed. We do not find any significant
effect for violent crime. The highest coefficient is for Burglary, followed by Assault.
18 For example, in the case of property crime, all non-property crime victims have been excluded from the
sample when estimating the ATT.




In the previous sections, we made clear that we chose LAPOP data because it allowed
us to take into consideration simultaneity issues between the treatment and outcome
variables. In this section, we repeat the previous exercises using the Chilean victim-
ization survey. The survey is run by the Chilean Ministry of The Interor and Public
Security (2016). It started in 2003, was repeated in 2005, and since then has become
annual.20 For the purposes of this study, we will use only the 2003 and 2005 waves,
which gives us two repeated cross sections.21 The reason for doing so is that only in
those two waves were there questions on participation in social groups.
The survey’s respondents were questioned whether they, or anybody else in their
household, had been victimized in the previous twelve months. This is our “treatment”
variable, which we labeled Victimization. In 2003, around 43% of the Chilean popu-
lation had been victimized, whereas in 2005, the percentage was 38.3%. Around 60%
of the victimized individuals had been a victim only once. Among the most frequent
crimes, there are property crimes, such as auto theft, general theft, and various types
of robberies. Regarding the control variables, we tried to follow as closely as possi-
ble the previous specification, depending on the availability of the data. Therefore,
we included age, gender, marital status, household size, whether she had obtained a
university degree, and whether she had moved within the last four years in the current
neighborhood.
Summary statistics are reported in Table 9. As we can see, the level of victimization
ismuch higher than in theLAPOPdata: 38.3%–43%vs. 17.4%. Indeed, the fact that the
question is at the household level explains part of this difference, but not completely.
Again, property crime rates are much higher than violent crime rates.22
We first evaluate the effect of being victimized on the level of trust in various insti-
tutions. Respondents to the Chilean victimization survey were asked to say whether
they had none, some, or a lot of confidence in some of the most important institutions
of the country. Here we consider carabineros, the PDI, the Supreme Court, the Min-
istry of the Interior, judges, deputies, the President of the Republic, and senators.23 We
created a dummy equal to one if they answered a lot, and zero otherwise. The results
of the PSM exercise are displayed in Table 10
Similarly to the previous results, victimized people have lower levels of trust in
institutions compared to non-victims. Such decrease is stronger for institutions that
are directly in charge of law enforcement. For example, a victim of crime is 4.3% less
likely to trust the police. This value is slightly lower than the one found earlier, 6.5%,
and the one by Corbacho et al. (2015), 10 %. Continuing, the effect onMinistry of the
Interior is sizable and significant. Contrary to our previous exercise and the existing
literature (Blanco 2013), we do not find a statistically significant effect for Supreme
20 For more information, consult the website of the Chilean Ministry of the Interior and Public Security.
21 2005 was a particularly important year for Chile, as it had general elections. However, this should not
have an effect on our research question.
22 Given the richness of the questions on crime, here property crime is the sum of burglary, robbery with
surprise, economic crime, and theft. Violent Crime includes assault, rape, and robbery with violence.
23 Carabineros and the PDI are two types of police.
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Victim 36,152 0.389 0.488 0 1
Property Crime 36,164 0.273 0.446 0 1
Violent Crime 36,164 0.098 0.297 0 1
Theft 36,153 0.114 0.318 0 1
Burglary 36,159 0.079 0.270 0 1
Assault 36,154 0.033 0.179 0 1
Trust
Carabineros 35,510 0.368 0.482 0 1
PDI 34,745 0.346 0.476 0 1
Supreme Court 33,032 0.107 0.309 0 1
Minister of Interior 32,065 0.200 0.400 0 1
Judges 34,372 0.089 0.285 0 1
Deputees 34,729 0.038 0.191 0 1
President Republic 35,075 0.368 0.482 0 1
Senators 34,622 0.053 0.225 0 1
Participation
All Groups-INE 33,675 0.538 0.499 0 1
Religious 36,034 0.246 0.430 0 1
Political 36,009 0.018 0.132 0 1
Union 36,004 0.059 0.236 0 1
Sports 36,011 0.148 0.355 0 1
Cultural 36,019 0.068 0.251 0 1
Voluntary 35,992 0.050 0.219 0 1
Neighbors 36,026 0.092 0.289 0 1
Court. Victimization is also having little, or no effect, on trust in deputies and senators.
For example, the (negative) coefficient for the President of the Republic is only 1.2%.
Continuing, we consider the effect of Victimization on participation in various
social groups. People were asked whether they had participated in various social
organizations in the previous twelve months. Respondents could choose from among
fourteen organizations, ranging from laboral to cultural ones.24 We created a dummy,
which we called All Groups-INE,25 equal to one if the respondent participated in
at least one organization. Table 11 shows that those who have been victimized are
more likely to participate in social groups than are those who have not been. For
example, a victim is 6.1% more likely to participate in any of the above mentioned
groups. This coefficient is about 2.5 times higher than the one found in Table 7 with
data from LAPOP. Such overestimation could be due to the different timing of the
questions (previous twelve months) and the largest number of social organizations in
the Chilean victimization survey. Nevertheless, the direction and significance of the
24 The last option was “other” if they had not participated in any of the fourteen listed groups.
25 The acronym INE stands for the Chilean National Institute of Statistics.
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Table 10 Impact of Victimization on Trust in various Institutions using the Chilean victimization survey
ATT S.E. # treated # untreated
Carabineros
Nearest Neighbur (1) −0.043*** 0.007 13,906 21,592
Nearest Neighbur (100) −0.049*** 0.005 13,906 21,592
Radius (r = 0.03) −0.043*** 0.007 13,906 21592
PDI
Nearest Neighbur (1) −0.040*** 0.007 13,634 21,100
Nearest Neighbur (100) −0.035*** 0.005 13,634 21,100
Radius (r = 0.03) −0.040*** 0.007 13,634 21,100
Supreme Court
Nearest Neighbur (1) 0.008* 0.005 13,069 19,952
Nearest Neighbur (100) 0.001 0.004 13,069 19,952
Radius (r = 0.03) 0.008* 0.005 13,069 19,952
Minister of Interior
Nearest Neighbur (1) −0.013* 0.006 12,711 19,342
Nearest Neighbur (100) −0.015*** 0.005 12,711 19,342
Radius (r = 0.03) −0.013** 0.006 12,711 19,342
Judges
Nearest Neighbur (1) −0.004 0.004 13,571 20,789
Nearest Neighbur (100) −0.006* 0.003 13,571 20,789
Radius (r = 0.03) −0.004 0.004 13,571 20,789
Deputees
Nearest Neighbur (1) −0.004 0.003 13,661 21,057
Nearest Neighbur (100) −0.004* 0.002 13,661 21,057
Radius (r = 0.03) −0.004 0.003 13,661 21,057
President Republic
Nearest Neighbur (1) −0.012* 0.007 13,763 21,301
Nearest Neighbur (100) −0.021*** 0.005 13,763 21,301
Radius (r = 0.03) −0.012* 0.007 13,763 21301
Senator
Nearest Neighbur (1) −0.002 0.003 13,604 21,006
Nearest Neighbur (100) −0.003 0.002 13,604 21,006
Radius (r = 0.03) −0.002 0.003 13,604 21,006
***Significant at the 1% level; **Significant at the 5% level; *Significant at the 10% level. This table reports
the ATTs using propensity score matching. The treatment variable is Victimization which is equal to one if
the individual has been victim of any type of crime in the previous twelve months. The outcome variables
are expressed in the left column and represent trust in various institutions. All of them are binary variables
equal to one if the respondent has lot of trust in such institutions. The data are taken from the Chilean
Victimization Survey (Chilean Ministry of The Interor and Public Security 2016). Nearest Neighbor (1)
means that each treated individual is matched with the closest untreated, whereas (100) uses the closest
100. In both cases, matching has been done without replacement. Radius (r = 0.03) means that matches
are used within the propensity score of 0.03, again without replacement. S.E. are the robust standard errors
derived from Abadie and Imbens (2006), Abadie and Imbens (2009) and Abadie and Imbens (2011)
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coefficients confirms that, if anything, victimized people increase the amount of social
capital along this dimension (Table 12).
The coefficents for the other organizations are all positive and significant. The
highest ones are for Cultural, Voluntary, and Sports. The social group with the lowest
coefficient is Political. Probably, people prefer to alleviate their stress by participating
in organizations which are more “recreational”. Again, the choice of algorithm has
very little effect on the size of the coefficients.26
6 Conditional independence and sensitivity analyisis
One of the main assumptions of the propensity score approach is the conditional inde-
pendence assumption (CIA).27 The CIA might fail because of omitted variables that
could play a big role in determining victimization and trust/participation in social
groups. For example, some physical and behavioral traits might be important in
explaining victimization but are not recorded in the data. For example, very skinny
people might be more likely to be robbed because they might be easier targets. Or peo-
ple that work at night could be more exposed to property crimes and violent crimes.
Therefore, we propose a sensitivity analysis that evaluate how robust are our findings
to the presence of such omitted variables. The CIA is not directly testable because
we do not know what the trust/participation in social groups of the victimized people
would have been had they not been victimized.
The sensitivity analysis relies on supposing the presence of an unobserved covari-
ate that causes deviations from uncofoundness. In this paper we focus on the test
proposed by Rosenbaum (2002). This model considers the relation between an unob-
served variable and the treatment assignment.28 The test evaluates what happens to
the p-values of the statistical tests of no effect of the treatment when two individu-
als (i and j) with the same covariates differ in terms of the probability of receiving
treatments. Formally, the probabilities, for each individual, of receiving treatment are:
Pi = Pxi ,ui = P(D = 1 | xi , ui ) = F(βxi +γ ui ), where xi are the covariates and ui
the unobserved variable (Rosenbaum 2002). The bounds on the odds ratio that either
individual will receive treatment are
1
eγ
≤ Pi (1 − Pj )
Pj (1 − Pi ) ≤ e
γ
eγ is 1 if the two individuals obtained the same probability of being treated. If,
instead, this is greater than one, for example 3, then they differ in the odds of receiving
treatment by a factor of 3. Then a Mantel and Haenszel test is conducted under the
null hypothesis of no treatment effect. The test tells what happens to the p-values of
the ATT when eγ increases. Moreover, it considers the situation of overestimation
26 As we said in Sect. 2, the coefficient found by Bateson (2012)was below 0.05
27 This assumption states that we can remove the selection bias by controlling on an extensive set of control
variables, which makes the treatment and control independent. Being victimized is assumed to be random
for people with the same propensity score.
28 We follow the example of Becker and Caliendo (2007) and assume that the unobserved variable is binary.
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Table 11 Impact of Victimization on participation in various social organizations using the Chilean victim-
ization survey
ATT S.E. # treated # untreated
All Groups-INE
Nearest Neighbur (1) 0.061*** 0.008 13,083 20583
Nearest Neighbur (100) 0.068*** 0.006 13,083 20583
Radius (r = 0.03) 0.061*** 0.008 13,083 20583
Religious
Nearest Neighbur (1) 0.018*** 0.006 14,025 21,998
Nearest Neighbur (100) 0.023*** 0.005 14,025 21,998
Radius (r = 0.03) 0.018*** 0.006 14,025 21,998
Neighbors
Nearest Neighbur (1) 0.013*** 0.004 14,019 21,996
Nearest Neighbur (100) 0.013*** 0.003 14,019 21,996
Radius (r = 0.03) 0.013*** 0.004 14,019 21,996
Political
Nearest Neighbur (1) 0.009*** 0.002 14,018 21,980
Nearest Neighbur (100) 0.008*** 0.002 14,018 21,98
Radius (r = 0.03) 0.009*** 0.002 14,018 21,980
Union
Nearest Neighbur (1) 0.020*** 0.004 14,015 21,978
Nearest Neighbur (100) 0.022*** 0.003 14,015 21,978
Radius (r = 0.03) 0.020*** 0.004 14,015 21,978
Sports
Nearest Neighbur (1) 0.025*** 0.005 14,015 21,985
Nearest Neighbur (100) 0.024*** 0.004 14,015 21,985
Radius (r = 0.03) 0.025*** 0.005 14,015 21,985
Cultural
Nearest Neighbur (1) 0.034*** 0.004 14,022 21,986
Nearest Neighbur (100) 0.032*** 0.003 14,022 21,986
Radius (r = 0.03) 0.034*** 0.004 14,022 21,986
Voluntary
Nearest Neighbur (1) 0.024*** 0.003 14,008 21,973
Nearest Neighbur (100) 0.025*** 0.003 14,008 21,973
Radius (r = 0.03) 0.024*** 0.003 14,008 21,973
***Significant at the 1% level; **Significant at the 5% level; *Significant at the 10% level. This table reports
the ATTs using propensity score matching. The treatment variable is Victimization which is equal to one if the
individual has been victim of any type of crime in the previous twelvemonths. The outcome variables are expressed
in the left column and represent various social organizations that compose the All Groups-INE variable. All of
them are binary variables equal to one if the respondent participated in that organization. The data are taken from
the Chilean Victimization Survey (Chilean Ministry of The Interor and Public Security 2016). Nearest Neighbor
(1)means that each treated individual is matched with the closest untreated, whereas (100) uses the closest 100. In
both cases, matching has been done without replacement. Radius (r = 0.03) means that matches are used within
the propensity score of 0.03, again without replacement. S.E. are the robust standard errors derived from Abadie
and Imbens (2006), Abadie and Imbens (2009) and Abadie and Imbens (2011)
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Table 12 Impact of different crime types on participation inAll Groups-INE using the Chilean victimization
survey
ATT S.E. # treated # untreated
Property Crime Nearest Neighbur (1) 0.075∗∗∗ 0.009 7738 22,608
Nearest Neighbur (100) 0.063∗∗∗ 0.007 7738 22,608
Radius (r = 0.03) 0.075∗∗∗ 0.009 7738 22,608
Violent Crime Nearest Neighbur (1) 0.032 ∗ ∗ 0.017 1910 22,608
Nearest Neighbur (100) 0.036∗∗∗ 0.012 1910 22,608
Radius (r = 0.03) 0.039 ∗ ∗ 0.017 1910 22,608
Theft Nearest Neighbur (1) 0.072∗∗∗ 0.014 2527 24,207
Nearest Neighbur (100) 0.069∗∗∗ 0.010 2527 24,207
Radius (r = 0.03) 0.072∗∗∗ 0.014 2527 24,207
Burglary Nearest Neighbur (1) 0.036 ∗ ∗ 0.018 1592 22,618
Nearest Neighbur (100) 0.037∗∗∗ 0.013 1592 22,618
Radius (r = 0.03) 0.036 ∗ ∗ 0.018 1592 22,618
Assault Nearest Neighbur (1) 0.026 0.034 420 21,714
Nearest Neighbur (100) 0.062∗∗∗ 0.024 420 21,714
Radius (r = 0.03) 0.026 0.034 420 21,714
***Significant at the 1% level; **Significant at the 5% level; *Significant at the 10% level. This table reports
the ATTs using propensity score matching. The treatment variables are various crime types. The outcome
variable is All Groups-INE and it considers participation in any social group. The data are taken from the
Chilean victimization survey (ChileanMinistry of The Interor and Public Security 2016).Nearest Neighbor
(1)means that each treated individual is matched with the closest untreated, whereas (100) uses the closest
100. In both cases, matching has been done without replacement. Radius (r=0.03) means that matches are
used within the propensity score of 0.03, again without replacement. S.E. are the robust standard errors
derived from Abadie and Imbens (2006), Abadie and Imbens (2009) and Abadie and Imbens (2011)
of the treatment effect, Q+MH , and underestimation, Q
−
MH . The first case is the most
important to us because we assume that there could be a positive bias. Those that are
victimized are more likely to participate in social organizations.We perform such tests
for trust in other people, Other People, and participation in all groups, All Groups.
The tests for the specification with Victimization and Other People can be seen in
Table 13. The study is insensitive to the presence of omitted variables. As predicted,
Q−MH gives always significant ATTs. On the other hand, the results for All Groups
show that the results are insensitive to a bias that would increase the odds of being
victimized by 5% but sensitive to a bias that would lead to a 10% increase. The p-value
of the ATT would then be positive again for eγ = 1.15 and above (Table 14).29
7 Conclusions
Social capital is one of the most powerful concepts of the social sciences. The study
of its determinants is important for deepening our understanding of it. In the present
paper, we move a step forward compared to the existing literature and consider the
29 This is a similar case to the one presented by Becker and Caliendo (2007).
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Table 13 Sensitivity analysis
using Rosenbaum bounds:
Victimization on Other People
Gamma Q_mh+ Q_mh- p_mh+ p_mh-
1 14.422 14.422 0.000 0.000
1.05 16.867 11.979 0.000 0.000
1.1 19.201 9.652 0.000 0.000
1.15 21.433 7.430 0.000 0.000
1.2 23.574 5.303 0.000 0.000
1.25 25.630 3.264 0.000 0.001
1.3 27.607 1.305 0.000 0.096
1.35 29.513 0.560 0.000 0.288
1.4 31.352 2.377 0.000 0.009
1.45 33.130 4.129 0.000 0.000
1.5 34.849 5.823 0.000 0.000
This table shows the sensitivity analysis proposed by Rosenbaum
(2002). The treatment variable is Victimization and the outcome vari-
able is Other People. The data are taken from AmericasBarometer for
all Latin American and Caribbean countries for the period 2004–2012.
The sensitivity analysis considers the relationship between an unob-
served variable and the treatment variable. Gamma represents how
different are the odds of receiving treatment for individuals with the
same covariates. Gamma equal 1 means that they have the same proba-
bility, whereas 1.05 means that they are 5% different. Q+MH considers
the case of overestimation of the treatment effect, Q−MH is the case of
underestimation. The p-values show the significance level of the ATTs
in both cases
effect of victimization on two important dimensions: trust and participation in social
groups. In order to explore this empirical question, we use individual data taken from
all Latin American and Caribbean countries from 2004 until 2012 using LAPOP data.
Our estimation technique is propensity score matching, because victimization could
be seen as randomly assigned after controlling for various socio-economic variables.
The results, in Table 6, clearly show that victimized people have lower levels of trust
compared to non-victims. In particular, “treated” people have lower trust in other
people and in institutions that directly manage law and enforcement. For example, a
victim is about 6.5% less likely to trust the police compared to somebody who has not
been victimized. These results are in line with recent work on this topic (Corbacho
et al. 2015; Blanco 2013; Blanco and Ruiz 2013). However, compared to the existing
literature, we focus on more countries and for a longer period of time. Moreover, we
clearly distinguish between organizations involved in law enforcement management,
such as the police, compared to others that are not, such as the media.
Besides the issue of trust, we also analyze how victimization affects participation
in social groups. This relation has been largely unexplored in the literature. We use
LAPOP data, which include questions on the frequency of participation in social
organizations. In such awaywecan take into considerationpossible simultaneity issues
between the treatment and outcome variables. Table 7 shows that victimized people
increase their level of participation in social groups compared to non-victims. A victim
of any type of crime is about 2.5% more likely to participate in All Groups, a dummy
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Table 14 Sensitivity analysis
using Rosenbaum bounds:
Victimization on All Groups
Gamma Q_mh+ Q_mh- p_mh+ p_mh-
1 4.421 4.421 0.000 0.000
1.05 2.065 6.778 0.019 0.000
1.1 0.160 9.026 0.437 0.000
1.15 2.305 11.176 0.011 0.000
1.2 4.360 13.235 0.000 0.000
1.25 6.332 15.213 0.000 0.000
1.3 8.227 17.115 0.000 0.000
1.35 10.052 18.947 0.000 0.000
1.4 11.811 20.714 0.000 0.000
1.45 13.510 22.421 0.000 0.000
1.5 15.153 24.073 0.000 0.000
This table shows the sensitivity analysis proposed by Rosenbaum
(2002). The treatment variable is Victimization and the outcome vari-
able is All Groups. The data are taken from AmericasBarometer for
all Latin American and Caribbean countries for the period 2004–2012.
The sensitivity analysis considers the relationship between an unob-
served variable and the treatment variable. Gamma represents how
different are the odds of receiving treatment for individuals with the
same covariates. Gamma equal 1 means that they have the same proba-
bility, whereas 1.05 means that they are 5% different. Q+MH considers
the case of overestimation of the treatment effect, Q−MH is the case of
underestimation. The p-values show the significance level of the ATTs
in both cases
equal to one if the respondent participated in any of the following organizations:
Religious, Community, Professional Organization, and Political Party. Such results
could be explained through the stress buffer hypothesis (Cohen and Wills 1985). This
theory states that people seek social support to cope with stressful periods, such as
being a victim of crime. Moreover, we find that victims of property crime increase
participation in social groups more than do victims of violent crime.
As a robustness check, we estimated the model using the Chilean victimization
survey. Again, we find similar results: victimized people trust less than non-victims,
but participatemore in social organizations. Sensitivity tests, to the presence of omitted
variables, reveal that the results are quite robust, especially for the model with trust.
In conclusion, this paper helps to analyze victimization from a different angle. On
the one hand, we confirm that victimization reduces the stock of social capital by
increasing mistrust in other people and organizations. On the other hand, the effect on
participation in social organizations suggests that there is an increase in the stock of
social capital. The positive effect on participation is a good thing. A forward looking
public administrator should be aware of this and exploit such findings by coordinating
and facilitating the creation of social groups. For example, the World Bank has a
long history of promoting programs for the creation of social capital in developing
countries (Vajjaa and Whiteb 2008). This would be beneficial to victims of crime, by
reducing the time of “recovery” from such a stressful event, and reducing crime. As
noted by McIlwaine and Moser (2001), in their study of Colombia and Guatemala,
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“social capital may be simultaneously eroded, fostered or reconstituted by violence,
resulting in both positive and negative aspects of the phenomenon” [ibid, p. 966].
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